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1. Climate change and urban insecurity 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overall picture about the resilient capacity of cities 
in South Korea in terms of adaptation to climate change. In the discussion about climate 
change so far, with the enthusiasm to prepare for the coming green bubble based on the 
expansion of renewable energies, too many resources and efforts have been concentrated 
on the mitigation rather than adaptation of climate change. However, adaptation deserves 
more serious concern regarding its impending and broad impact on human lives and those 
of other living beings. Recently, in particular after COP7 at Marrakesh, 2001, the focus of 
debate on climate change has shifted to adaptation.     
 
As cities are estimated to emit almost 75% of greenhouse gas globally, they have been 
arenas of competition for measures to mitigate GHGs. However, cities are also vulnerable to 
climate change. Almost 2/3 of the world‟s population resides in cities, and almost half of city 
populations live in dilapidated dwellings or as squatters. This means that the globally 
dominant landscape of cities is slums (Davis, 2007). As „poverty eradication‟, the number 
one target of the Millennium Development Goals, does not appear close to achievement, 
slum-dominant urbanization will likely expand.  
 
Residents of the slum are not equipped with proper measures against natural disasters 
resulting from climate change such as urban floods, drought, epidemic diseases, heat waves, 
and so forth. Such vulnerability of cities is exacerbated by social factors like poverty, 
distorted population structure, chronic economic depression, unemployment, uprooted 
democracy, political oppression and so forth. Disproportionate burdens are placed on those 
least able to bear the cost. This means that climate change superimposes risks on the 
existing vulnerability of cities, which is derived from social factors (Hayes, 2008).  
 
Urban security is endangered by the negative combination of social, economic, historical and 
ecological factors that are related to climate change. In other words, there are many layers 
beneath the relationship between urban insecurity and climate change. In line with such 
interconnections, enhancing the climate change adaptation capacities of cities could be 
understood to build resilience by increasing cities‟ ability to deal with current climate-related 
problems, preparing them to take advantage of new opportunities, and reducing the risks 
and costs of future climate change (Riley & Dalton, 2008). Therefore, to understand whether 
cities are able to adapt to or have resilience against the impact of climate change, we should 
figure out the latent layers beneath the cities. In the following sections, I will give brief 
explanations about the several layers of factors affecting cities in South Korea, i.e., political 
and historical, social and economical, manufactured environment, and ecological layers. 
Based on this understanding, I believe we can develop appropriate options for urban 
adaptation strategies to counter climate change.  
 
2. Latent layers of urban insecurity in South Korea 
 
2.1. Historical and political layer 
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As is well known, modern development of South Korea has been a process of making a 
modern nation-state. It is full of agony and conflict; colonization by imperial Japan, 
antagonism between the left and right wings, the Korean War, the divided-system of South 
and North Korea, military dictatorship, and a bloody democratization movement opposing the 
dictatorship. Among them, the legacy of Korean War and subsequent divided-system of 
South and North Korea has influenced every aspect of South Korean society: the political 
party system, economic growth policies, mentality of ordinary citizens, education system, 
cultural pattern, communications, emotions, mode of production of nature, and so forth. The 
divided system between North and South Korea paralyzed the progressive movement in 
South Korea. The relationship between North Korea and South Korea can be described as 
antagonistic dependency. The result of this legacy of a divided-system is the prevalence of 
an extremely conservative anti-communist ideology.  
 
Another historical attribute of the modernization of South Korea is “negotiated 
democratization.” Although there were remarkable democratization movements, including 
numerous martyrs for democracy, student resistance and labor movements against the 
military regime and ruling elites, there was no revolution which reformed all the members of 
the existing ruling class. Through the democratization movement, formal democracy has 
been established, but substantial or practical democracy is not secured yet. Of course, there 
was a change in presidency. However, two presidents (Mr. Kim, Young-Sam and Mr. Kim, 
Dae-Joong) before Mr. Roh, Moo-Hyun, who were believed to represent the democratic 
groups, were actually the result of negotiated coalitions between conservative political 
groups. They could not perform the “transitional justice” to mature democratization (Elster, 
2004). The same story can be applied to the case of Mr. Roh, even though there are 
differences to some extent. Therefore, the conservative political milieu has been sustained 
without transformation and the ruling class was not changed.   
 
Such attributes of modernization, a “divided-system” and “negotiated democratization,” has 
made political conservatism dominant in South Korean society. In other words, negotiated 
democratization and the divided-system of North-South Korea have frustrated the maturation 
of democracy in South Korea. Conservative society limited the political imagination toward 
an admirable society. This means that the representation of various political and social 
interests are sterilized or limited. Although Koreans have accomplished democratization 
through unprecedentedly strong social movements against military dictatorship, practical 
democracy has not been institutionalized yet. With the seizure of political power by the 
conservative party after 10-years of the democratic party, democracy seems to be retreating. 
Peaceful candlelight demonstrations against the import of US beef were violently oppressed; 
a famous internet blogger who criticized the foreign currency policy of South Korea was 
arrested; the national security law remains; a law allowing newspaper companies to own 
broadcasting companies is proceeding towards enactment. So to speak, the return of a 
dictatorship is the proof of a feasible foundation of democracy in South Korea. Weak civil 
society has struggled to create alternative measures to tackle with the issue of climate 
change.  
 
2.2. Social and economic layer 
 
South Korea was regarded as a successful example in the field of combating poverty. Since 
the rapid and compacted economic growth itself had lessened poverty, the social inequality 
issue was not that serious in spite of very low levels of social welfare (Chang, 2005: 98-99). 
At that time, poverty could be called „the poverty of hope.‟ This means that, if one works hard, 
he or she could escape from the poverty trap (Chang, 2005: 96).  
 
However, after the IMF crisis, things changed. Poverty and social inequality became a 
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crucial social agenda. In particular, as neoliberal reshuffling policies were adopted to cope 
with the economic crisis, poverty became more deepened and structuralized. Relative 
poverty rates of 40% of the middle level income (based on disposable income) increased 
from 4.8% in 1996 to 10.5% in 2003 (Kim, M.G., et. als., 2006: 17). And the characteristics of 
prevalent poverty were also changed. Due to the severe dichotomization of society, just 
“hard work” cannot guarantee an opportunity for escaping the poverty trap. Thus, recent 
poverty is characterized as a problem of „the working poor‟ (Kim, Y.R., 2005).  
 
Working poor households make up 55.7% of the total number of poor households. The 
average income of households with irregular jobs is only 75% of that with regular jobs, and 
the debt of irregular job holders is 58% of those with regular jobs. However, the size of 
redemption of debt of households with irregular jobs is 88% of those with regular jobs. On 
top of this, the average savings of households with irregular jobs is just over 50% of those 
with regular jobs (<Table 1>, <Table 2>).  
 
<Table 1> Socioeconomic characteristics by employment types 
Employment 
Types 
Average Member 
of household 
(person) 
Average age of 
head of household 
(year) 
Average 
monthly income 
(10,000 KRW) 
Average 
monthly saving 
(10,000 KRW) 
Debt 
(10,000 
KRW) 
Employer 3.45 46.2 235.7 40.7 3,779 
Regular job 3.34 43.2 209.7 33.5 3,847 
Irregular job 3.20 46.4 157.6 19.0 2,238 
The others 2.84 52.6 109.8 9.2 1,352 
Unemployment 2.87 58.6 92.7 7.1 2,714 
Total 3.23 47.4 178.3 25.5 3,024 
Source: KOCER, 2003, “Survey of Poor Household in Seoul”, modified and cited from Chang(2005: 107) 
 
 
<Table 2> Comparison of monthly expense by household of regular/irregular jobs 
(unit: 10,000 KRW, %) 
 Buying 
Food 
Dining 
Out 
Transport Communi 
cation 
Housing Medical 
Care 
Culture Paying 
Debt 
Saving Total 
Expenses 
Regular 
(A) 
30.4 7.6 16.0 11.2 12.8 7.6 4.5 51.7 33.5 175.3 
Irregular 
(B) 
29.9 6.2 14.7 10.0 10.3 7.1 3.6 45.3 19.0 146.1 
Ratio 
(B/A) 
98.4 81.6 91.9 89.3 80.5 93.4 80.0 87.6 56.7 83.3 
Source: Chang(2005)     
 
This means that households with irregular jobs are trapped by the past and future at the 
same time; the burden for the redemption of debt and miserable savings (Chang, 2005: 108). 
Due to such structured attributes of new poverty, it is called a „poverty of despair‟ (Chang, 
2005: 96). It entails multiple deprivations: social exclusion, social distancing (or segregation), 
cultural and psychological isolation, and so forth (Chang, 2005: 102-103). 
 
The change of population formation makes the cities of South Korea more vulnerable. 
According to the U.N. standard of age structure, South Korea is categorized as an „aging 
society‟, because the proportion of the population over 65-years is 9.5% of the total 
population as of 2006 and is estimated to reach 32.5% in 2040.   
  
<Table 3> Transition of age structure of population(1970∼2040) 
- 
Population(thousand) Proportion(%) 
Total 0∼14 
15∼64 
(productive population) 
Over 65 0∼14 15∼64 Over 65 
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1970 32,241 13,709 17,540 991 42.5 54.4 3.1 
1980 38,124 12,951 23,717 1,456 34.0 62.2 3.8 
1990 42,869 10,974 29,701 2,195 25.6 69.3 5.1 
2000 47,008 9,911 33,702 3,395 21.1 71.7 7.2 
2006 48,297 8,996 34,715 4,586 18.6 71.9 9.5 
2017 49,332 6,395 36,119 6,818 13.0 73.2 13.8 
2018 49,340 6,286 35,979 7,075 12.7 72.9 14.3 
2026 49,039 5,721 33,099 10,218 11.7 67.5 20.8 
2030 48,635 5,525 31,299 11,811 11.4 64.4 24.3 
2040 46,343 4,777 26,525 15,041 10.3 57.2 32.5 
Source: National Statistics Office, 2006, Future Transition of Population 
 
In addition to this, South Korea has the lowest fertility rate among OECD countries (1.26 as 
of 2007). Also, a considerable portion of the aged population is also faced with the issue of 
poverty. The absolute poverty rate of the over-65 population was 9.27% (total 4.94%), and 
the relative poverty rate of this group was 17.35% (total 9.53) in 2002 (Choi, O.G., 2007:5). 
Owing to the poor conditions of living, the health of the aged population is threatened. From 
2003 to 2007, 654 persons died due to malnutrition. Among them, 386 (59%) were over 70 
years old (Yonhap News, 2009. 2.25). Elderly people are apt to be located in poor living 
conditions and need more help from the social welfare system. Therefore, the overall burden 
of the productive populace (for example, taxation for welfare system, the huge cost of 
medical care, payment of pensions and so on) will increase tremendously within a very short 
time.  
 
To make things worse, the unemployment rate of the young generation (age 20-30) was 
around 7% (approximately 200,000 persons) in 2008. On top of this, the global financial 
crisis set off from the U.S. cast dark shades on the future of the productive populace in 
South Korea. Without the provision of proper jobs, they could not play basic roles to support 
the economic development of society which could be the platform for responding to climate 
change. In other words, without sufficient economic resources, the stability of urban 
community or urban governance for adapting to climate change will be also at stake.  
 
2.3. Built environment layer 
 
In the course of rapid urbanization, South Korea has experienced large-scale housing 
construction through unprecedented urban redevelopment projects. About 17% of all types 
of residential houses built between 1973 and 1995 were the result of the redevelopment of 
slum and dilapidated neighborhoods (Shin, H.B., 2008: 411). Urban redevelopment was 
proceeded by profit-led and partnership- (public-private) based approaches. Thus, slums 
and dilapidated neighborhoods (in Korean “san-dong-ne” means „village located on an urban 
hill‟) were under pressure of development due to the lack of locations for apartment 
construction. Therefore, “san-dong-ne” were demolished and transformed into apartment 
complexes (<Figure 1>).    
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<Figure 1> Disappearing slums in Seoul by redevelopment 
Source: Nam, W.S., 2004: 88 
 
However, the process of demolition of dilapidated neighborhoods was always accompanied 
by violence. In 1987, UN-Habitat named South Korea as one of two countries that had 
exercised forced eviction in the most brutal and inhumane manner (Shin, H.B., 2008: 412). 
As the government had no willingness or capacity to pursue urban development based on 
public support, the purpose of redevelopment was to provide middle classes with nice 
dwellings and to generate profits rather than to rehabilitate native residents. The right of a 
decent life and the living conditions of poor tenants at the sites was not properly considered 
by the government, landlords, and developers. The tenants of the dilapidated neighborhoods 
had no ability to buy the redeveloped apartment house despite subsidies from the 
government, whether provided either in-kind or cash (Kim, S.H., 2009; Shin, 2008). 
Therefore, there was always serious conflict in the process of redevelopment. Even this year 
(2009), the tragedy of violent and profit-led urban development was reiterated again at 
Yongsan, near downtown Seoul; five people including one policeman died owing to brutal 
eviction procedures.  
 
To make a long story short, residential places for the poor have been redeveloped and 
provided for the middle class as decent residential places (Kim, S.H., 2009: 5). The dwelling 
condition of the poor deteriorates more and more, while apartment flats become the 
dominant landscape of cities. The figure below shows the apartment flat-oriented dwellings 
provision of South Korea (<Figure 2>).  
 
 
 
<Figure 2> National housing construction by dwelling type in South Korea 
Source: Shin, H.B., 2008: 423 
 
„Apartment-flat-dominant landscape‟ is accompanied with extensions of roads. Generally 
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speaking, roads and roofs of buildings are the main impervious covers of cities, which have 
serious impacts on hydrological circulation and the degradation of water quality. According to 
a case study of the urban natural disaster of the Ahnyang river in Kyunggi Province, an 
increase in rainfall and the expansion of impervious cover has made the damage from urban 
floods greater than before (Lee, Y.Y. et als, 2004). Since the hydrological circulation is 
interrupted due to the increase of impervious cover, the vulnerability of the city is also 
increased. When it comes to the issue of the distribution of national revenue, huge amounts 
of the budget is used for the construction of roads. From FY 2000 to FY 2005, approximately 
105.3 trillion KWR (around 105 billion USD) of revenue has been used for construction and 
improvement of roads (Jung, K.M., 2008). Considering the size of the annual national 
revenue is around 250 billion USD in FY 2009, this is a terrific amount. The total extension of 
roads in 2004 was 100,278 Km and the social cost from traffic congestion was 4.4% of GDP 
of 2005. Therefore, the hydrological circulation of urban areas of South Korea would be 
more threatened.   
 
2.4. Ecological layer 
 
As the modernization and urbanization of South Korea was environment-blind development, 
ecological layers of urban security can be unsustainable. In spite of strong air quality control 
regulations of government, the air quality (NO2 and PM10) of cities has been degraded due 
to an increase in demand for automobiles and industrial activities.   
 
<Table 4> Annual Air quality of South Korea 
  
`99 `00 `01 `02 `03 `04 
NO2 
(ppm) 
SMA 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.031 0.034 0.033 
Total 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.024 
PM10 
(㎍/m3) 
SMA 59 59 66 69 66 63 
Total 51 53 58 61 56 58 
Source: Ministry of Environment, 2005, Annals of Air Quality 
 
 
Moreover, yellow dust or sand storms from China and Mongolia have aggravated the air 
quality (PM10 and PM 2.5) of South Korea throughout the year.  
 
 
<Figure 3> Sand Strom over Korean Peninsula 
Source: Chosun Newspaper, 2007.1.18 
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In South Korea, waste is roughly classified into two categories, according to its source of 
origin: municipal waste from households and industrial waste from business sites or factories 
of large scale (generation of waste above 300kg/day). Industrial waste is further divided into 
two categories: „general industrial waste‟ which consists of slag, ash, dust, and construction 
waste, and „designated waste‟ which consists of toxic wastes such as waste acid, waste 
alkali, waste oil, waste organic solvent and so on. To effectively address the waste issue, it is 
important to reduce waste generation and recycle unavoidable waste as much as possible. 
To that end, the Korean government is focusing on minimizing waste generation through 
regulating the use of disposable products and the generation of packaging material waste, 
and implementing the Extended Producer Responsibility policy. Since 1993, the total amount 
of waste generation, in particular, construction waste, has steadily increased although the 
recycling rate of construction waste is quite high (83.4% in 2002). The trend of waste 
generation from 2001 to 2005 is summarized in <figure 4>.  
 
 
<Figure 4> Trend of waste generation of South Korea 
Source: Ministry of Environment (2007) 
 
Even though 97% of primary energy consumed is imported from abroad, the increase rate of 
energy consumption of South Korea is still high when compared to the average of OECD 
countries. (<Table 3>) 
 
<Table 5> Energy Consumption of South Korea 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Consumption of primary energy  
(1000 TOE) 
192,887 198,409 208,636 215,067 220,238 
Per capita total energy 
consumption(TOE) 
4.10 4.19 4.38 4.49 4.58 
Energy consumption per 
GDP(2000=100) 
100.0 99.1 97.4 97.4 95.3 
Energy 
consumption 
Increase rate(%) 
South Korea 5.87 2.51 4.65 3.32 2.55 
Average OECD 2.10 -0.60 0.61 1.02 1.64 
Source: GreenKorea(2006) 
 
Nuclear power accounted for 38.2% of total electricity generation and 14.8% of primary 
energy in 2004 (Green Korea 2006). As of 2006, the total provision of primary energy was 
230 million TOE and renewable energy was 4.9 million TOE (2.13%).  
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<Figure 5> Provision of primary and renewable energy 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy, 2007, Annals of Energy Statistics 
 
The GHG emission increase rate from 2000 to 2005 was 12.1% and without the reduction of 
GHG, it is to be expected to increase to 37.7 percent, compared with 2005. Due to the heavy 
burden of investment and reluctance from industry sectors, South Korea does not have a 
national target goal for GHG reduction.  
 
<Table 6> GHG emission indices of South Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Shin,E.S.(2009) 
 
However, each local government is preparing for climate change according to its governance 
capacities. For example, Seoul city set up a GHG reduction target (25% reduction in 2020 
based on emission volume of 1990); Kwangju city operates a „Carbon Bank System‟ through 
cooperation with private banks, and Ulsan city is enthusiastic to pursue many CDM projects. 
 
3. Response of government to climate change 
 
Even though South Korea is an OECD country, the status of South Korea in the Convention 
of Climate Change has been one of a non-Annex 1 country. Thus, the strategy of South 
Korea facing the convention was quite negative: avoid a fixed target of GHG reduction. 
However, in the course of preparing a post-2012 system, international pressure on South 
Korea regarding setting up fixed targets of GHG reduction is getting stronger. The negative 
strategy does not seem to work anymore.  
 
At the ceremony of the 60th anniversary of liberation day in 2008, President Lee Myung Bak 
announced that  “Low Carbon, Green Growth” should be a national goal for the next 60 
years. The key point of this goal is to utilize environment for further growth and to prepare for 
climate change through green technological breakthroughs.  
 
Emission related Indices South Korea Rank Reference 
Increase rate 
(„00~‟05) 
12.1% 4 No.1 Luxemburg (33.3)  
Emission volume 590 M.ton/ Year 9 
No.1 USA (70.7) 
No.2 China (47.3)  
Emission per GDP 0.62 ton/1000 USD 8 
No.1 Australia (0.86),  
No.4 USA (0.66)  
Per Capita Emission 12.24 ton/capita 13 No.1 Luxemburg (27.9)  
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<Table 7> Green Growth Vision in Comprehensive National Energy Plan (2008-2030) 
Vision Index 2006 2030 
Transition to energy 
independent society 
Independent development rate 3.2% 40% 
Portion of renewable energy 2.2% 11% 
Transition to low energy 
consuming society 
Energy Intensity 0.347 0.185 
Transition to oil free society Oil dependency 43.6 33% 
Energy welfare Portion of energy poverty 7.8% 0% 
New growth engine and job 
creation 
Level of energy technology 
60% of advanced 
countries 
Leading level 
Source: Lee, S.H(2008) 
 
Following this announcement, the government proclaimed its “Green New Deal” plan which 
contains many projects: expanding mass transit and railroads (jobs created: 138,067), 
energy conservation (170,702), fuel efficient vehicles and clean energy (14,348), 
environmentally friendly living space (10,789), four major rivers restoration (199,960), forest 
restoration (133,630), water resource management (small and midsize dams, 16,132), 
resource recycling (including fuel from waste, 16,196), national green information service 
(GIS) and infrastructure (3,120). It is expected that 149,000 jobs will be created in 2009, 
mainly in construction (UNEP, 2009).      
 
Despite the audacious plan of the Green New Deal, there are severe criticisms about the 
feasibility of the plan regarding its anti-environmental feature and lack of governance. In 
terms of feasibility, there is no concrete plan for procuring huge amounts of budget for 
pursuing the plan. In particular, the economy of South Korea is about to experience an 
unprecedented crisis. How can the Korean government secure enough money for 
implementing the planned projects? Even though the new strategy is called „green,‟ 
contradiction exists. According to the new strategy, 14 more nuclear power plants will be 
constructed (accounting for 60% of South Korea‟s power generation) to cope with climate 
change.1 As nuclear power plants do not emit GHG, it can be called low carbon energy. 
However, considering the environmental impact through the life cycle of nuclear power, it 
cannot be called „green.‟ And among projects of the green new deal, the four major rivers 
restoration is suspected to be the preparation stage for building the „Grand Canal,‟ which 
was planned to connect the two main rivers of South Korea for logistical navigation but was 
cancelled after heated controversy nationwide. The most serious shortcoming of the plan is 
that it is pursued without sufficient social consensus. To make a low carbon society, active 
participation of multi-stakeholders and cooperation of people is the most important element. 
However, the stance of the government is quite authoritarian and even hasty. Moreover, 
adaptation of climate change is not a main focus of the plan. 
 
In terms of adaptation, the government of South Korea published its „National 
Comprehensive Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change‟ (2008.12.24). The vision of the plan 
is to establish a safe society and support green growth by climate change adaptation. There 
are short-term targets and long-term targets of the plan. The short-term target is to 
strengthen the comprehensive and systematic capacity of adaptation to climate change 
(2008~2012). For this target, making a vulnerability map of Korea and achieving a level of 
forecasting and monitoring technology 70% of that of advanced countries are suggested as 
sub-targets. The long-term target is to reduce the risk of climate change and realize the 
                                                          
1
 According to 4
th
 national comprehensive policies for climate change, South Korean government is supposed to 
ask the parties of UNFCCC to recognize the records of reducing GHG through nuclear power plant. 
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opportunities from climate change (2008~2030). For this target, decreasing damage from 
climate-related disasters by 10% of past levels (1996~2005) and achieving production from 
adaptation action equivalent to 1% of GDP are suggested as sub-targets. For these goals, 
five strategies are also provided: establish a scientific and comprehensive evaluation system 
for climate change adaptation; prepare cost-effective and sustainable adaptation programs; 
construct domestic partnerships for enhancing capacity and awareness to adaptation; 
secure global leadership through international cooperation and contribution; and establish an  
institutional base for strengthening the implementation of adaptation action (Ministry of 
Environment and other ministries of South Korea, 2008). However, the budget for adaptation 
is only 0.1% of the total revenue for climate change (2005~2007). Therefore, the feasibility of 
the plan is still questionable. 
 
4. Tentative conclusion: Multiple vulnerabilities of cities in South Korea 
 
Based on the above brief explanation about the multiple layers of urban security in South 
Korea and the response of government to climate change, it can be said that many cities in 
South Korea are faced with multiple vulnerabilities; i.e., facing combined and overlapping 
risks that arise from human institutions (Hayes, 2008: 19).  
 
Political conservatism has gained strength after the conservative party seized political power. 
Under such circumstances, various political opportunities or ideas for responding to climate 
change is restricted. For example, suggestions and unharnessed discussion about 
alternative economic systems to cope with tragic consequences from neoliberal globalization 
might be prohibited as threatening social security. Also, the military concept of security can 
dominate over the concept of environmental security. Thus, when it comes to adaptation 
against climate change, it adds an undesirable impact on the resilient capacity of cities of 
South Korea.   
          
The severe dichotomization of society after the economic crisis and the unstable population 
structure also makes cities of South Korea vulnerable to climate change. Poverty and aged 
population issues are big challenges to social security. That is, production in economy and 
reproduction in society are in trouble. People become too busy to build urban communities 
as they have to survive in a competitive market. Thus, urban governance for adapting to 
climate change does not seem to work properly. In particular, as the brutal and inhumane 
manner of urban redevelopment has not changed despite the criticism from UN-Habitat in 
1987, the possibility of making good urban governance for climate change seems to be small.    
 
Expansion of the impervious cover of cities and apartment-flat-centered urban development 
imperils the ecological security of cities, which is already endangered in many ways: 
deteriorated air quality, often and strong sand storms, increased waste generation, high 
energy consumption rate, high increase rate of GHG, and so forth. The strategy of “Low 
carbon, Green growth” initiated by the government has many flaws, as mentioned above. 
How can we survive the multiple vulnerabilities we are facing? How can civil society take 
initiative in enhancing the capacity for resilience of the cities?        
 
NGOs in South Korea have experienced several victories in the struggle for democratization 
and even in environmental protection. However, the issues of climate change are too 
professional, complicated, and technical for staffs and members of NGOs to handle. It does 
not mean that they cannot take initiative in the field of adaptation to climate change. 
Recognizing the limitation of capacity of civil society, and in particular NGOs, the initiative of 
civil society regarding adaptation to climate change should focus on education issues first. 
To do this, the capacity of NGOs should be raised. And as a possible option for enhancing 
the capacity of NGOs, establishing NPOs focusing on adaptation issues could be considered. 
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